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violence. Those who oppose the adoption of such a plan argue that the ultimate
solution to the crime problem is to attempt to reduce the number of victims68 by
allocating to crime prevention the vast sums which would be expended annually
on compensation. The proponents of compensation plans, however, argue that
such plans are merely logical extensions of present government policy.6 9 Com-
pensation is not an acceptance of the present crime rates, nor does it preclude
a vigorous program of crime prevention.
Critics of the existing and proposed legislation have relied heavily upon
the argument that too many mechanical problems remain unsolved.7 0 After
examining some possible solutions to these problems, it is clear that the obstacles
to a workable plan are not insurmountable and hopefully those legislative bodies
currently drafting legislation in this area will find practical solutions to them.
ROBERT A. SANDLER
THE POLYGRAPH IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY:
REGULATION, OR ELIMINATION?
Throughout history man has attempted to find methods for determining
the truth. Some of the earliest efforts aimed at distinguishing fact from fantasy
were predicated on the physical reactions of the subject and included such
practices as the primitive trial by ordeal (where the removal of an unharmed
hand from a fire was determined by judicium Dei) and the Chinese method of
chewing dry rice powder while being questioned.
Today, modern polygraphy ("lie detection") is more sophisticated than
the ancient rice chewing of the Chinese yet the theory underlying both practices
is essentially the same. The hypothesis of both methods is that emotional states
of human beings are accompanied by observable physiological responses, such
as changes in heart rate, breathing and skin temperature and that the psycho-
logical stress which results from telling a lie produces distinguishable physio-
logical responses.
EXTENT OF THE POLYGRAPH'S USE IN INDUSTRY
The use of the lie detector by private industry and the government has
greatly increased in recent years. The sharply multiplying number of polygraph
examinations given by business firms and government agencies to present and
prospective employees has become a matter of increasing national concern. One
author has commented that "probably no other technique of intrusion will ulti-
mately bring on more of a battle royal between the forces promoting its general
68. See Compensation for Victims of Criminal Violence, A Round Table, 8 J. Pub. L.
191, 218 (1959).
69. Note, Compensation for the Victims of Criminal Violence, 40 St. John's L. Rev.
67, 73 (1965).
70. See, e.g., Childres, supra note 26, at 283.
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acceptance and the forces that consider it a vicious instrument for invading
privacy."1 Management has been swift to view the polygraph as a panacea to
insure employee dedication because of its scientific nature and its apparent
infallibility.
The purpose of this article is to provide some insight into the controversy
surrounding industry's use of the polygraph. Emphasis will be placed on the
limitations of the machine and the lack of scientific verification of the machine's
reliability and accuracy. Public reaction to industry's use of the polygraph and
management's justification for such procedure will be evaluated. The reaction
of a number of state legislatures, including New York State, who have either
prohibited use of the machine in employment, or sought to regulate its operators,
will be appraised. Hopefully the extent of polygraph testing and the need for
proof of its accuracy, as well as legislative protection from its shortcomings, will
become apparent.
In private industry apologists of the machine contend that the polygraph
examination can take up where regular investigative methods leave off or are
ineffective. It is also asserted that polygraph examination has been useful in
reducing thefts and screening potential and present employees for such un-
desirable characteristics as bad habits and sexual deviation. Advocates of the
polygraph also claim that extensive reductions in pilferage and theft have re-
sulted from its use. It has been reported that up to 33% of all business failures
are attributable to employee thefts and that internal losses in money and mer-
chandise approach 2 billion dollars annually representing 5% of the cost of
goods to the consumer.2 It has also been reported that an employee may pilfer
for an average of three years before being caught by common investigative
methods.3 To combat such losses many companies have engaged security
agencies to conduct polygraph examinations 4 and a few maintain their own
examiners.6
Proponents of the machine in industry point to a few cases where its use has
resulted in substantial theft reduction. For example, the supermarket operator
who discovered through "lie detector" examinations that 90%o of his employees
were stealing over one million dollars a year, whereas upon reexamination a
year later, only 3% were recidivists.6 Because of the controversy surrounding
the machine, satistics revealing the extent of its use in industry are not readily
available.
Several hundred investigative firms have leaped into the lucrative field of
employee testing (the average cost for screening by commercial operators is
1. Brenton, The Privacy Invaders, pp. 91-92 (1964).
2. N.Y. Times, June 18, 1962, p. 14.
3. Ibid.
4. E.g. Dale System Inc., John E. Reid and Associates, Burns Detective Agency,
Pinkerton National Detective Agency and Lincoln M. Zohn Inc.
S. McKesson and Robbins, world's largest distributor of drug products, has its own
company examiners.
6. Business Week, Bvsiness Uses the Lie Detector, June 18, 1960, p. 98.
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twenty to thirty dollars per person) and it has been reported that there are
about 1,500 commercial polygraph operators in the United States at the present
time doing about 80% of their work for private companies and the remainder
for police departments.? Records of several commercial polygraph firms are
some indication of the widespread and increasing use of the tests. John E. Reid
and Associates of Chicago conducted approximately 5,200 tests in 1964, the
majority for private companies. This was an increase of 4,400 tests over 1962
and 1963. Truth Verification, Inc., a Dallas firm, conducted 26,000 tests in
1963 and 42,000 tests in 1964.8 It has been claimed that in Texas alone approxi-
mately 5,000 firms now require employees to take periodic tests.9 It has also
been reported that efforts have been made by at least one polygraph agency to
introduce their detection methods to businesses and industries in South America
and Australia.'" An official of one of the larger polygraph agencies told one
commentator that every type of retail store and manufacturing outfit now uses
the machine for pre-employment and pilferage checks." An official for the John
Reid agency related that almost every big company uses lie detectors occasion-
ally.' 2 The Dale System, polygraphic agency, states that among others it works
for Westinghouse Electric Corp., Howard Johnson, Grand Union Co. and W. T.
Grant Co.' 3 McKesson and Roberts, Inc., wholesaler of pharmaceuticals, uses
the lie detector as a regular part of its employment process on a nationwide
basis to screen out undesirable employees who would otherwise have access to
dangerous drugs and narcotics. The company security director reports that such
use of the polygraph is carefully controlled and tests are given by staff members
with college degrees in psychology.14
Companies normally require employees and applicants to sign a statement
of consent and release before taking the examination. This release absolves the
company of any liability in connection with the test. According to one labor
publication, some releases give blanket authority for using the test results for
any purpose desired by the company.15 This would, of course, allow it to turn
over the test results to other employers. The release may also confer upon the
employer the right to discharge the employee at any time if he refuses to take
the test or fails to be cleared by it.16
Where the employer engages an outside polygraph firm the usual procedure
7. Suffridge, The Silent Assault on the Right to Privacy, The Federationist, Aug.
1965, p. 1.
8. Coghill, The Lie Detector in Employment-A Review of Current Efforts to Ban It,
Technical Reports Series, p. 5 (The Industrial and Labor Relations Library, N.Y. School
of Industrial and Labor Relations, Sept. 1965) ; Wall Street J., April 8, 1965, p. 1.
9. Packard, The Naked Society, p. 47 (1964).
10. Ibid.
11. Brenton, supra note 1, at 93.
12. Coghill, supra note 8, at 5.
13. Packard, supra note 9, at 47.
14. Industrial Relations News, Special Report, March 1963, p. 1-4.
15. What Happens When the Lie Detector is Wrong?, The Advocate, Dec. 1964, p. 2.
16. Ibid.
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is to have the applicant or employee execute a second waiver for the protection
of the agency. Since the test will not be given without the waiver a refusal to
sign is a refusal to be tested. The waiver relieves the examiner of any respon-
sibility for erroneously finding an innocent worker "guilty" of a theft thus
causing loss of employment and serious impairment of future job opportunities. 17
The federal government's use of the polygraph was investigated in 1964
by the House Committee on Government Operations.' 8 These hearings indicated
that 19 federal agencies using 639 operators and 512 machines conducted ap-
proximately 20,000 tests at a cost of almost 42 million dollars in the fiscal
year ending mid-1963.19 Only the CIA and NSA use the polygraph routinely
for pre-employment screening.20 The FBI uses the polygraph as an investigative
aid in carefully selected cases involving criminal and security violations but
does not use it in interviewing job applicants or in personnel screening.2'
All indications are that both the government and private industry have
become devoutly proselytized to the apparent efficacy of the polygraph in re-
solving their suspicions about employees' loyalty .and honesty. Such use of the
machine has raised many serious questions concerning its reliability and accu-
racy, the competency of its operators, its invasion of privacy and degradation
of human dignity and the self-incrimination of its subjects. These problems,
and the appropriate legislative response, are the subject of this discussion.
THE INSTRUMENT, THE TEST AND THE OPERATOR
The polygraph is a relatively simple instrument when contrasted with other
contemporary electronic devices. Its three components are: (1) a pneumograph
-a corrugated rubber tube which is fastened around the chest and which ex-
pands and contracts as the subject breathes, thus measuring respiration rate;
(2) a cardiosphygramanometer-an inflated rubber cuff, such as used by phy-
sicians to measure blood pressure and pulse rate; (3) two electrodes which are
attached to the hand to measure galvanic skin response (G.S.R.), which is the
flow of electric current across the hand as the perspiration rate increases.22
Each of these devices activates a pen which records the particular physiological
response on a graph.
Prior to the test every effort is made to convince the subject of the in-
fallibility of the machine. It has been stated that the most ideal subject is the
17. Ibid.
18. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations
cof the House of Representatives on the Use of the Polygraph by the Federal Government,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-5 (1964) [hereinafter cited as 1964 Hearings].
19. House of Representatives Report No. 198, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., table of agency
replies (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 House Report No. 198].
20. Id. at 16.
21. 1964 Hearings at 514. During the fiscal year the FBI handled 666,982 investigative
matters with the polygraph utilized in 593 investigations or in .09 per cent of the in-
vestigations.
22. Inbau and Reid, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation, 5-9 (1953).
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one who feels powerless before this "marvel" of the electronic age28 and the
subject must have fear and respect for the technique if he is to be responsive. 24
The usual test takes approximately forty-five minutes and is entirely oral.
The examiner usually conducts a trial run or "pre-test" to establish a responsive
norm for the subject. Questions designed to evoke "normal" responses are asked
in order to develop the "normal" base lines for each subject on the graphs which
the examiner later uses to interpret the subject's reactions to more pertinent
questions.25 Presumably all deviations from the norm when crucial questions
are asked indicate emotional stress and thus deception on the part of the subject.
It is almost standard procedure for the questions to be read or shown to the
subject before the test, the theory being that if he is the thief or has something
to hide he will instantly recognize the crucial questions, i.e., those that pertain
to past dishonesties, and fix his attention on them. Hence, in spite of himself
he will build up tensions as the crucial questions approach and any lies will be
clearly indicated.26
An adequately trained and experienced examiner is alleged to be essential
for a proper polygraph examination. 27 One authority in the field commented
that the polygraph is "only as reliable and valid as the examiner. '28 Proponents
of the machine assert that its usefulness depends entirely upon the way the
operator questions his subject and interprets the physiological responses. Vir-
tually anyone of average intelligence can learn to operate the polygraph within
a short time. The interrogation techniques and the interpretation of the results,
however, are alleged to require a high degree of intelligence and perception.29
"The key to accuracy is the examiner himself, and his own personality, motiva-
tion, training and experience. '8 0
There are, at present, a number of schools offering courses in polygraphy,
varying in length from six weeks to six months.3 There are at least four asso-
ciations representing polygraph examiners, but they primarily operate as media
for the exchange of ideas, have no enforceable standards, and are by no means
trade associations.8 2 These organizations do recommend basic qualifications for
examiners, i.e., that he be a college graduate and of high moral character. The
23. Laymon, Lie Detectors-Detection by Deception, 10 S.D.L. Rev. 1, 5. (1965)
24. 1964 Hearings at 18.
25. Higheyman, The Deceptive Certainty of the Lie Detector, 10 Hastings L.J. 47, 55
(1958); Inbau and Reid, supra note 22, at 13-63.
26. Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence, 70 Yale L.J. 694 (1961).
27. Testimony before the 1964 Hearings at 457, indicated that there are no restrictions
on purchasing a polygraph, which may cost from $600 to $2,000. Thus anyone can become
a "lie detector" operator for just the purchase price.
28. Arthur, The Lie Dptector-Is it of Any Value?, 24 Fed. Prob., Dec. 1960, p. 36.
29. Bennett, A Penal Administrator Views the Polygraph, 24 Fed. Prob., Dec. 1960,
p. 40.
30. Ibid.
31. 1964 Hearings at 183.
32. 1964 Hearings at 39. These associations are: The National Board of Polygraph
Examiners, The American Academy of Polygraph Examiners, The International Association
of Polygraph Examiners and The Academy for Scientific Interrogation.
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number of examiners in the country today has been estimated at about 1,500,
most of whom have received no more than six months training in its use. 8
VALIDITY AND LIMITATIONS OF THE INSTRUMENT AND ITS OPERATORS
Champions of the polygraph have estimated its accuracy at ninety-five per
cent with a four per cent margin of indefinite determination and a one per cent
margin of possible error.3 4 Testimony given at the hearings of the House Com-
mittee on Governmental Operations on the Federal Government's Use of the
Polygraph has indicated, however, that proof of such accuracy was only ob-
tained in 18.9 per cent of the cases involved.3 5 One expert from the Institute of
Defense Analysis who analyzed the entire field, with specific reference to a ten
year period covering approximately 200,000 tests given by the department, con-
cluded that "up to the present time it has proved impossible to uncover sta-
tistically accceptable performance data to support the view held by polygraph
examiners that lie detection is an effective procedure."3 6 The simple fact is that
the necessary data has not been kept and that an impartial appraisal of the
device has not yet been accomplished. Not only is there an absence of verifica-
tion but, unfortunately, few psychologists or psychiatrists have conducted re-
search in this area. The congressional committee concluded that "... research
completed so far has failed to prove that polygraph interrogation actually de-
tects lies .... "3 It recommended that the federal government prohibit use of
the machine in all but the most serious national security cases and that com-
prehensive research to determine the validity and accuracy of polygraph exami-
nations be conducted. 38
Proponents of the polygraph have stated that the machine operator's in-
terrogative and interpretative skills are the most important factor in the
technique, yet they also acknowledge that only about twenty per cent of the
current operators are duly qualified.30 Experts testifying before the federal sub-
33. 1964 Hearings at 60, 61; Sternbach, Gustafson & Coller, Don't Trust the Lie
Detector, Harv. Bus. Rev., Dec. 1962, p. 127.
34. Inbau and Reid supra note 22, at 111, state that this estimate of accuracy involved
a study of 4,280 suspects of criminal offenses. Of this number, 64.5% were reported by the
polygraph to be innocent of the crime, 31.1% were reported guilty, and 4.4% were indefinite.
According to Sternbach supra note 33, at 130 however,
Of the group of persons reported guilty, only 791 (59.3%) were 'Interrogated with
the aim of obtaining a confession,' and of these only 61.4A% did confess. In other
words, only 36% of the individuals who were reported as guilty on the basis of
their polygraph records were actually verified as such. Together there were 18.9%
of total cases verified as correct. The percentage of verified errors was 0.07%
(the figure of .0007%7 cited in the book is incorrect).
According to testimony before the congressional committee, 1964 Hearings at 32, the Inbau
and Reid estimate of 95%7 is based on the fact that later confessions from the polygraph
subjects conclusively verified all but 1% of the 18.9% reported verified.
35. Ibid.
36. 1964 Hearings at 426-27.
37. 1965 House Report No. 198, supra note 19, at 1.
38. Id. at 2.
39. Inbau and Reid, The Lie Detector Technique: a Reliable and Valuable Investigative
Aid, 50 A.B.A.J. 470 (1964); McDonald, The Lie Detector Era, Part I, The Reporter, June
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committee were unanimous in agreeing that minimum qualifications for a
polygraph examiner should include a college degree and at least five years of
investigative experience. Of the five states which presently regulate polygraph
examiners only one approaches these criteria in setting qualifications for a license
to operate a polygraph.40
It is recognized that any validity which the polygraph might have can be
defeated by a number of psychological or physiological conditions present in
certain individuals.41 These are: (1) Extreme Nervousness-high emotional
tension or nervousness caused by fear of being accused'or arising from a guilt
complex involving matters unrelated to the issues at hand. Several Harvard
psychologists have concluded that although lying will produce physiological
changes,
other factors often produce physiological changes which are very
similar. For example, there is the real danger that the changes which
occur are not the result of a 'feeling of guilt' itself, but rather of re-
calling some information or of a shift in attention, or perhaps a sudden
fear of the consequences of being pronounced guilty.42
(2) Physiological Abnormalities-abnormally high or low blood pressure, heart
diseases, and respiratory disorders are examples of the types of physical ab-
normalities that can lead to inaccurate test results. (3) Mental Abnormalities43
-such a feeblemindedness, psychoses or insanities, e.g., paranoids, schizophre-
nics; psychoneuroses and psychopathia. Pathological liars or persons who can
rationalize a falsehood to the extent it becomes true to themselves can also
frustrate the tests. For example, a mental patient who said he was Napoleon
and believed it was telling the truth according to the polygraph.44 (4) Unre-
sponsiveness-a lack of emotional response can seriously hinder accurate testing.
Such unresponsiveness could be due to (a) a lack of fear of detection, (b) an
8, 1954, p. 10. McDonald stated that leading professionals admit that not more than 10%
are truly competent.
40. Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, § 202-1 to 30 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
41. Inbau and Reid, supra note 22, at 19-25; 1965 House Report No. 198, supra note
19, at 12.
42. Sternbach, supra note 33, at 128.
43. The often quoted example is that of the case study of the maladjusted bank vice-
president by Dearman and Smith, Unconsious Motivation and the Polygraph Test, 119
The American journal of Psychiatry 1017 (1963), where a routine polygraph test taken
by a bank vice-president indicated he had stolen some funds, yet a complete audit failed
to reveal any shortages. A second and third test convinced the polygraph examiner that
the official had stolen some money and that it was between eight and eleven hundred
dollars. Another audit however failed to reveal any deficits so the vice-president was
referred for psychiatric examination. The psychiatrists found that the young man had
strong ambivalent feelings for his mother and wife. Both were customers of the bank and
had been involved in quite legitimate financial transactions with him to the extent of eight
to eleven hundred dollars. When asked by the polygraph examiner, "Have you ever stolen
from the bank or its customers?" he unconsciously responded to the customers part of the
question inasmuch as he identified his wife and mother as customers and inasmuch as he
felt guilty about the financial dealings he had with them.
44. 1965 H.R. No. 198, supra note 19, at 12. One commentator has suggested that sex
may also affect the reliability of the tests, "because women lie more skillfully and stick to a
lie with greater resolution." Id. at 13.
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ability to control one's responses through certain mental attitudes or sets, or
(c) mental fatigue. (5) Bodily Movement-Physical movement, pain or mus-
cular activity can lead to misleading blood pressure and hence inconclusive
test results. Examiners caution subjects against such movement. If any move-
ment is seen by the operator the reading of the machine can be disregarded.
However, if unobserved, muscular activity can produce misleading results.
These uncontroverted deficiencies in the polygraph technique, the critical
lack of any public body of knowledge to support the percentage of accuracy
claimed by its proponents, and the acknowledged lack of competent operators
have been the primary considerations on which adverse judicial, legislative and
public reaction to the device has been founded. The majority of courts have
continually refused to admit the results of polygraph tests into evidence.45
As will be shown, arbitrators have been almost unanimous in deprecating its use
by employers, and organized labor has been successful in securing legislative
prohibition of the tests in seven states. The polygraph associations have also
been successful in securing legislative licensing and regulation of their profes-
sion in a small number of states.
LABOR ARBITRATION AND THE POLYGRAPH
Significant protection for the unionized employee from industry's increas-
ing use of the polygraph has been granted by labor arbitrators. Such protection
has been extended where unions, rightly concerned about justice for the em-
ployees they represent, have resisted the lie detector through union-management
contracts which provide for the settlement of labor disputes by arbitration.
In a landmark case in 1958,46 an employer proposed that all employees in
a particular department be required to take lie detector tests in order to ascertain
who had been making false incentive reports. No employee was bound by a pre-
employment agreement to take such a test. Despite the fact that the company
proffered testimony as to the machine's alleged ninety-five per cent accuracy, the
arbitrator ruled that the employer could not use the machine as a substitute
for its obligation to monitor incentive plans. He stated that the time has not
yet come when management can consign to a machine the job of supervision,
especially when the machine is to take the employee in its embrace and measure
his most intimate, vital processes.47 This "penetrating analysis of the problem
45. The courts have been almost unanimous in refusing to admit the results of "lie
detector" tests into evidence. Inbau and Reid, supra note 22, at 122 conclude, after an
exhaustive survey of significant court decisions in all jurisdictions, that at the present time
the tests have no judicial recognition. They also state .that until the estimated accuracy of
95 per cent is generally attainable, and a much higher degree of standardization achieved,
the courts should continue to withhold judicial sanction of the test results.
The usual reason for rejection given by the courts is that lie detection by means of the
polygraph has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition as to justify its ad-
missability. Moenssens, Licensing of Detection of Deception Operators in Illinois, 41
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 115 (1964).
46. General American Transportation Corp., 31 Lab. Arb. 355 (1958).
47. Ibid.
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in the context of modern industry has set a course which has been largely
followed since." 48
The arbitration decisions have largely paralleled the position of the courts
in refusing to admit polygraph tests as evidence because of their lack of re-
liability and accuracy.49 Where the employee has refused to submit to the test
such refusal has been held not to be proof of his guilt and not to be prejudicial
to him in any way.60 Refusal to take the test has also been held not to be such
insubordination as to warrant a discharge.51 Where an employee failed the test,
the result has been held not to be proof of guilt and insufficient to support a
discharge.5 2 Even where an employee, upon being hired, agreed to take a test
whenever asked to do so by the employer as a condition of continued employ-
ment, his later refusal has been held not to be insubordination and insufficient
to warrant a discharge. 53
The National Labor Relations Board has also dealt with the use of poly-
graphs. In one recent case54 the employer threatened to use the machine to
force employees to reveal their union activities. The Board held the employer
guilty of unfair labor practice in violation of 8(a) (1) of the N.L.R.A. These
decisions indicate that the polygraph technique, in the eyes of a majority of
arbitrators, has not yet attained sufficient validity and accuracy to justify its
use to resolve employment problems. It must be pointed out, however, that
arbitrators are delineating the "common law of the shop" 55 only where the
employees are unionized and their contracts with management have provided
for arbitration in such situations. One commentator feels that future arbitration
is "likely to limit the use of the lie detector in industry as much as courts have
limited their use in litigation."55 The use of polygraph tests in the pre-employ-
ment context, however, is not ordinarily subject to the labor agreement. 57 It
is against such use of the machine by industry that organized labor is seeking
and has attained to a limited extent aid from the legislatures.
LEGISLAT VE REACTION TO THE POLYGRAPH
Organized labor is wholly in opposition to the use of the polygraph in in-
dustry and government. The union position was reiterated and reaffirmed in
48. Burkey, Lie Detectors in Labor Relations, 19 Arb. J. 195, 198 (1964).
49. E.g., Saveway Inwood Service Station, 44 Lab. Arb. 709 (1965); Continental
Air Transport Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 778 (1962) (Tests inadmissable even with employees'
consent because they have no probative value); Brass-Craft Mfg. Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 1177
(1961) (It is a diagnosis rather than a conclusive determination of truth or falsehood);
B. F. Goodrich Tire Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 552 (1961) (Lie detector tests alone cannot prove or
establish fact).
So. Sanna Dairies, Inc., 43 Lab. Arb. 16 (1964).
51. Skaggs-Stone, Inc., 40 Lab. Arb. 1273 (1963).
52. Louis Zahn Drug Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 352 (1963).
53. Lag Drug Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 1,121 (1962).
54. Glazer's Wholesale Drug Co. Inc., 1965 CCH NLRB 9311 (1965); See also, Dale
Industries and United Industrial Workers, 1964 CCH NLRB 12,853 (1964).
55. Burkey, supra note 48, at 198.
56. Ibid.
57. Id. at 204.
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1965, when the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO adopted a strong resolution
condemning the use of the polygraph in private and public employment. The
council stated:
We object to the use of these devices, not only because their claims
of reliability are dubious but because they infringe on the fundamental
right of American citizens to personal privacy.
Neither the government nor private employers should be permitted
to engage in this sort of police state surveillance of the lives of indi-
vidual citizens.58
In addition, a special subcommittee was appointed by the council to campaign
for legislation to eliminate the use of the polygraph.
There are at present two basis forms of polygraph legislation in a small
number of states. One type has completely forbidden use of the device by
business as a condition to employment. The form of enactment has sought
to license and regulate the polygraph operators.
ANTI-PoLYGRAPH LEGISLATION
Several states have paid heed to the protests of labor unions and have
enacted anti-polygraph legislation.59 These statutes generally prohibit em-
ployers from making initial or continued employment of an individual contin-
gent upon his submission to a polygraph test. Such legislation has generally
exempted only governmental or law enforcement use of the device. The state of
Washington, however, in enacting the latest polygraph statute, has specifically
exempted law enforcement agencies, the narcotic and drug industries and persons
in sensitive positions directly involving national security.0° The California
statute is typical of anti-polygraph legislation. It provides:
No employer shall demand or require any applicant for employ-
ment or prospective employment or any employee to submit to or take
a polygraph . . . test ... as a condition of employment or continued
employment. The prohibition of this section shall not apply to the
federal government . . . or the state government .... 1
The Massachusetts statute, however, seems to extend the protection to situations
where an employee is required to take a test to qualify for a raise or promotion.
It reads:
Any employer who subjects any person employed by him, or any
person applying for employment, to a lie detector test, or causes, di-
58. Suffridge, supra note 7.
59. Cal. Labor Code § 432.2; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 149, § 19(B) (1963); R.I.
Gen. Laws Ann. § 28-6.1-1 to 2 (1964); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 659.230 (1963); Alaska Stat,
§ 23.10.037 (1964); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 49.44-(1)-(2) (1965). Similar legislation is now
being pressed for in a number of other states. In addition, several municipalities have out-
lawed its use in industry. Congressional Committee Hits the Lie Detector Myth, The Ad-
vocate, June 1965, p. 3.
60. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 49A4-(1)-(2) (1965).
61. Cal. Labor Code § 432.2.
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rectly or indirectly, any such employee or applicant to take a lie
detector test, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred
dollars. This section shall not apply to lie detector tests administered
by law enforcement agencies in the performance of their official
duties.0 2
Penalties for violation of these statutes may reach as high as a one thousand
dollar fine and one year imprisonment.63
LICENSING AND REGULATION OF POLYGRAPH EXAMINERS
Five states have acknowledged the polygraph problem and have enacted
measures regulating the polygraph industry itself.64 These states require exam-
iners to be licensed by the state and have set differing qualifications for issuance.
Such legislation is intended to reduce the number of unscrupulous and un-
qualified examiners and the resultant harm they cause. Even apologists of the
polygraph acknowledge that a mere twenty per cent of polygraph operators are
competent.6 5 These regulatory statutes establish standards and qualifications
for examiners as to citizenship, age, moral fitness and integrity, and absence of
a criminal record. They also require that a polygraph which measures at least
two of the usual physiological patterns be used. Only Illinois, however, requires
that the applicant for a polygraph license have an academic degree, of at least
baccalaureate level. 66 Texas requires a baccalaureate degree or five years of in-
vestigative experience. 67 All of the licensing states except New Mexico require
either that the applicant be a graduate of a polygraph examiner course ap-
proved by the state or that he successfully complete internship training. All
but Kentucky require the applicant to pass a state examination.
LEGISLATION IN NEW YORK STATE
In 1965 two anti-polygraph bills, of the same nature as those passed in
other states, were passed by the state legislature but failed to receive guberna-
torial approval. 6 Another bill which provided for limited restriction of the
use of the polygraph in business, and examination, licensing and regulation of
62. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 149, § 19(B) (1963).
63. Alaska Stat. § 23.10.037(d) (1964).
64. Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 38, § 202-1 to 30 (Smith-Hurd 1964); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 329.010-
.990 (1962); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 67-31-1 to 14 (1965); N.D. Cent. Code § 43-31-01 to 17
(1965); Tex; Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 2615f-2 (1965).
65. Inbau & Reid, supra note 39.
66. Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. § 202-11(F). (Smith-Hurd 1964).
67. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 2115f-2, § 7(5) (1965).
68. Senate Bill, Intro 279, stated, No employer shall require or subject any person to
a lie detector test as a condition of employment or of continuing employment. Any person
violating this section is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than five
hundred dollars or imprisonment of not more than thirty days, or by both. This bill was
vetoed. Governor's Disapproval Memorandum No. 61 (1965) stated the reasons as ambi-
guities as to scope of the Terms "lie detector" and "employer" in the bill. Assembly Bill
Intro 4439, specifically allowed lie detector tests for state and local police forces. This bill
was also vetoed, Disapproval Memorandum No. 173, because of its immediate effective
date, thus imposing criminal sanctions without adequate notice.
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polygraph examiners failed to reach the floor of the assembly before the end
of the session.6 9
This year, 1966, four bills were introduced to the state legislature and were
committed to respective committees.70 Three of these bills are of the anti-poly-
graph type."1 The fourth proposes a limited restriction on use of the polygraph
and examination of licensing of examiners.72
Anti-polygraph Bills-(1) Senate Bill 1342-prohibits the requirement of
a lie detector test of any person as a condition to securing or maintaining em-
ployment.73 (2) Senate Bill 1549-also prohibits an employer from requiring
a polygraph test as a condition of employment or continuing employment. This
bill, however, specifically exempts any employer engaged in the manufacture
or wholesale distribution of narcotics, hypnotics and barbiturates. 4 (3) Senate
Bill 1176-goes somewhat further and prohibits use of the device not only as
a condition of employment but for any purpose in connection with actual or
prospective employment. This construction would seem to prevent use of the
polygraph by an employer for purposes of employee promotion, etc. This bill
goes even further in extending protection for employees by forbidding any
business from soliciting or using results of tests of prospective employees who
have submitted to tests outside the state in determining employability. The
scope of such protection is limited however, for the bill exempts all employees
of the state and its municipal subdivisions.7
Polygraph Operator Licensing Bill---(4) Senate Bill 1198-prohibits use of
the polygraph only where the employer requires submission to the test as a con-
dition of continuing employment. This bill does not extend any protection to
prospective employees. It exempts governmental and law enforcement use of the
device and requires that a machine which records the three basic physiological
reactions be used. In regulating polygraph operators it proposes qualifications of
good moral character, a baccalaureate degree, at least one hundred and fifty
formal hours of training in courses approved by the state, and a state ex-
amination in order to secure an examiner's license.76
69. Senate Bill, Intro 3535. This bill not only established qualifications for an ex-
aminer's license but also prohibited the employer from requiring the taking of an examina-
tion as a condition of employment. It mandated a pre-examination procedure whereby the
subject must be advised of the voluntariness of the test and the fact that a refusal to take
it cannot lead to a discharge.
70. Intro S. 1342, Print 1367; Intro S. 1176, Print 1189; Intro S. 1549, Print 1577;
Intro S. 1198, Print 124; Intro A. 1991, Print A. 2013.
71. Intro S. 1342, Print 1367; Intro S. 1176, Print 1189; Intro S. 1549, Print 1577.
72. Intro S. 1198, Print 1214; Intro A. 1991, Print A. 2013.
73. Intro S. 1342, Print 1367 (introduced by Senator Brownstein).
74. Intro S. 1549, Print 1577 (introduced by Senator Laverne).
75. Intro S. 1176, Print 1189 (introduced by Senator Mackell). This bill also forbids any
use or solicitation of test results from without the state.
76. Intro S. 1198, Print S 1214 (introduced by Senator Bloom). Intro A. 1991, Print A.
2013 (introduced by Assemblyman Cincotta).
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INVASION OF PRIVACY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
Opponents of polygraph use by industry not only point to the shocking lack
of proof of the device's reliability and accuracy, but also claim that the proce-
dure constitutes an unwarranted invasion of the subject's privacy and a violation
of the privilege against self incrimination. 77
Invasion of Privacy-Representative Moss, at one point in the 1964 con-
gressional hearings on the federal government's use of the polygraph, called pre-
employment testing "a major invasion of privacy of individuals not even sus-
pected of a crime, where the price they must pay for seeking employment is the
probing on a broad basis in not only their conscious but their subconscious mind,
where dossiers are built up and transferred from one employer to another and
permanent prejudice can be created.78
Tort remedies for the invasion of privacy at the present time, however, have
been extended to four distinct kinds of invasion wholly concerned with the pub-
lication or commercial use of private facts.79 Even if such remedies were to be
extended, the employer would argue that the tests are voluntary, and in fact,
that it is routine procedure to require a signed consent from the individual.80
Where, however, prospective or continued employment is predicated by industry
upon submission to a polygraph test it is, realistically, impossible to find any
sincere voluntariness on the part of the individual. The refusal to take the test
is too often a presumption of guilt. One authority feels that "the interest
threatened by these new instruments is the same as that which underlies the
tort cases." 8' Nevertheless, since the employee has no basic common law right
to secure or retain a job with any company,8 2 and since submission to the test
is entirely "voluntary" it is unlikely that the courts will extend the invasion of
privacy concept to such a degree.
Critics of the polygraph fervently look to the Constitution, and more spe-
cifically to the fourth and fifth amendments, to substantiate their claims that
the polygraph is an arbitrary intrusion on individual privacy and that it causes
unlawful self-incrimination of the employee. A somewhat cursory but neverthe-
less necessary answer is that any protection extended under the fourth and fifth
amendments has been so granted only against government action. Constitutional
guarantees with respect to self incrimination are only applicable at trial or in
77. Suffridge, supra note 7.
78. 1964 Hearings at 373.
79. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 (1960) has stated the right to privacy to
be a complex of four torts extending to: (1) Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or
solitude, or into his private affairs (2) Public disclosure of embarrassing facts (3) Publicity
which puts the plaintiff in a false light and (4) Appropriation to the defendant's advantage
of plaintiff's name and/or likeness.
80. Restatement, Torts § 892 (1939) states "a person of full capacity who freely
and without fraud or mistake manifests to another assent to the conduct of the other is
not entitled to maintain an action of tort for harm resulting from such conduct."
81. Bloustein, The Right of Privacy, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 962, 1006 (1964).
82. United States Steel Corp. v. Nichols, 229 F.2d 396 (6th Cir. 1956).
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proceedings by the government or someone acting by the authority of the gov-
ernment.
83
CONCLUSION
In evaluating industry's present use of the polygraph and the relatively
recent legislative response to it, one must give serious consideration to the pri-
mary reason for such use. It has already been stated that internal theft losses
in money and merchandise by industry now approach two billion dollars annu-
ally and that for many companies rooting out workers who steal is a matter of
survival.84 It is estimated that seven out of ten workers steal something from
their employers.8 5 It is understandable then that industry would welcome any
scientific apparatus which seems to make detection of such dishonesty more sure
and discouragement of such malefactions more likely. One appraisal of the poly-
graph controversy has suggested that the present legislative approach to the
dilemma by prohibiting the use of the machine ignores any present utility it
may have and may retard research and development. It suggests that the better
approach to the problem would be a balancing of interests, providing protection
for the employee from abuse and misuse of the device and allowing the em-
ployer a limited use of it.6
It is, nevertheless, manifestly dangerous and detrimental to the public inter-
est to allow industry any use of the device until further research in the area
has proven the extent of its accuracy and reliability. The results attained by
certain employers in reducing thefts may be primarily attributed to the deterrent
effect of the machine caused by its present Orwellian image and not to the
apprehension of the culprits through use of "lie detecter" tests. Employees view
the tests as an indication of management suspicion and distrust and the implica-
tions are that the employment environment will be adversely affected. Workers
knowledgeable of the technique and its limitations, but nevertheless innocent of
any wrongdoing towards their employer, will be forced to attempt to "beat"87
the polygraph or succumb to a procedure so fraught with sources of error that
it may well pronounce them guilty. Traditional psychological tests, question-
naires, investigations, interviews and observations of performance may cost the
employer more time than the polygraph, but they are demonstrably more effec-
tive and reliable.8 8 The polygraph in its present stage is a tool for mental intimi-
dation, often eliciting unwarranted and irrelevant personal revelations from the
83. Menocal and Williams, Lie Detectors It Private Employment: A Proposal for the
Balancing of Interests, 33 George Wash. L. Rev. 932 .(1965).
84. N.Y. Times, June 18, 1962, p. 14.
85. 1966: A Year of Decision for the Polygraph, Occupational Hazards, Dec. 1965.
86. Menocal and Williams, supra note 83.
87. 1965 House Report No. 198, supra note 19, at 12. There are three ways to "beat"
the polygraph. These are: (1) modified yoga-the separation of the self from the outside
stimuli and the maintenance of an abstract frame of mind; (2) muscle tension-such as
tensing one's toes and; (3) exciting imagery-a mental reproduction of an exciting image
which the subject knows will get him excited or upset.
88. Lampert, Lie D'etectors-Industrial Use of the Polygraph, 13 DePaul L. Rev. 287
(1964).
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subject even prior to the connection of the apparatus. The technique frequently
causes self-humiliation and loss of self-respect on the part of the individual
tested. It would seem that the legislature need only look to the manifest absence
of any proof of the polygraph's reliability and accuracy as an investigative
method to justify any condemnation of its use.8 9 Hence, the most equitable step
for the New York State Legislature at the present time would be enactment of a
statute prohibiting any use of the device by any employer, whether it be for
continued employment, initial employment,; a raise, promotion or a mere loyalty
check. Such legislation should, however, permit use of the polygraph by law en-
forcement agencies and sensitive positions involving national security. Industry,
having the resources available, should be called upon to prove the reliability and
accuracy of the polygraph before it can be allowed to subject millions of workers
to the machine's determination of "truth" or "falsity."
RONALD J. THOMAS
REFERRAL SALES CONTRACTS: TO ALTER OR ABOLISH?
PROLOGUE
The buyer originally admitted the television salesman to his home to
present his sales talk only as a favor to a friend. The friend had recently
purchased a set from the same company, under a contract calling for the
friend to set up appointments with other persons who might be interested.
For each appointment the friend made, he received a cash payment; if the
friend submitted enough names the entire cost of his color TV would be re-
imbursed by these "referral" payments. When the friend called to get per-
mission to refer the seller to our buyer, he had been quite enthusiastic.
By a stroke of good fortune, the salesman was authorized to offer the
same deal to the buyer and his wife. After hearing the carefully rehearsed
and artfully structured sales talk, the buyer became genuinely interested. They
did need a new TV, but really hadn't been able to buy one. A free TV-espe-
cially a color set-would be a different matter.
Of course near the end of his glittering sales talk the salesman did require
a few signatures on certain forms, but he had assured them that there was
89. As Representative Reuss stated during the congressional hearings, 1964 Hearings
at 332, "Nobody has ever made a study of the' actual lie detector cases to determine
whether, not in the laboratory or in the quasi-laboratory, but in the field of activity, they
are in fact worth anything or not." According to the 1965 House Report No. 198, supra
note 19, at 24, "the Federal Government has spent more then $300,000 for research projects
on various phases of the polygraph.... " Included in these were studies to determine the
value of the device:
in counterinsurgence situations (such as Vietnam), experiments to expand the basic
polygraph instrument by including additional sensors . . . and attempts to add a
computer to the polygraph for purposes of objective measurement. These . . . all
relate to expanding the use and the instrumentation of the polygraph device.
However, none of the research is the basic work necessary to prove scientifically
that the polygraph technique is an effective tool for interrogation purposes.
